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THE LAST POOR PLUNDER FROM A
BLEEDING LAND1: THE FAILURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PROTECT
SYRIAN ANTIQUITIES
At length we stood on the end of the col and looked over Pal-
myra. I wonder if the wide world presents a more singular
landscape. It is a mass of columns, ranged into long avenues,
grouped into temples, lying broken on the sand or pointing one
long solitary finger to Heaven. Beyond them is the immense
Temple of Baal; the modern town is built inside it and its rows
of columns rise out of a mass of mud roofs. And beyond, all is
the desert, sand and white stretches of salt and sand again,
with the dust clouds whirling over it and the Euphrates 5 days
away. It looks like the white skeleton of a town, standing knee
deep in the blown sand.2
INTRODUCTION
n May 14, 1900, Gertrude Bell, an English explorer,
writer, and archaeologist wrote to her family describing
the striking image of Palmyra she saw upon her approach into
the ancient city, located in what is now the Syrian Arab Republic
(“Syria”).3 One hundred and fifteen years later, in mid-May
2015, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)4 witnessed the
1. GEORGEGORDONBYRON, CHILDEHAROLD’S PILGRIMAGE (1812), reprinted
in LORD BYRON: THE MAJOR WORKS 56 (Jerome J. McGann ed., 2008). Here,
Lord Byron is referring to the Elgin Marbles, which England acquired from
Greece in the early nineteenth century and has refused to return, despite re-
peated requests.
2. Letter from Gertrude Bell to her Family (May 14, 1900), reprinted in 1
THELETTERS OFGERTRUDEBELL (M. Fulton ed., 2004) [hereinafter Letter from
Gertrude Bell], http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks04/0400341h.html#ch5; Stuart
Jeffries, Isis’s Destruction of Palmyra: ‘The Heart has Been Ripped Out of the
City,’ GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2015/sep/02/isis-destruction-of-palmyra-syria-heart-been-
ripped-out-of-the-city.
3. Letter from Gertrude Bell, supra note 2.
4. Other names commonly used to refer to ISIS include: The Islamic State
in Iraq and the Levant, The Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham, Daesh, which
is ISIS’ Arabic name, or simply the Islamic State. Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britan-
nica.com/topic/Islamic-State-in-Iraq-and-the-Levant (last visited Dec. 31,
2016).
O
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same ancient temples as it began its first siege of Palmyra.5 Un-
like Bell, ISIS entered Palmyra as conquerors, seeking to expand
its territorial hold and exploit the city’s archaeological resources
in the name of ideology and financial gain.6 After receiving word
of ISIS’ approach, the Syrian Director-General for Antiquities
and Museums, Maamoun Abdulkarim, knew he could do little to
save the archaeological site from destruction by ISIS militants.7
Abdulkarim, however, did try to remove the antiquities housed
in the Palmyra museum and transport them to a safer location.8
Upon notice of approaching ISIS militants, the archaeologists in
Palmyra barricaded themselves inside the museum and boxed
antiquities for transport to a location outside ISIS control.9Upon
ISIS’ arrival in the city, the Syrian army soldiers who had been
guarding the archaeologists fled.10 As the ISIS militants ap-
proached the museum shooting, the archaeologists loaded the
last of the antiquities onto a truck for transport to a hidden lo-
cation, evading capture by mere seconds.11 The antiquities were
transported out of Palmyra and hidden in a secure location.12
Two months after ISIS’ siege of Palmyra, ISIS militants mur-
dered eighty-two-year-old Syrian archaeologist Khaled al-Asaad
in front of the Palmyra museum for refusing to reveal the loca-
tion of the hidden antiquities.13 Dubbed by some as “Mr. Pal-
myra,” al-Asaad dedicated his life to researching the Palmyrene
ruins.14 The ISIS militants beheaded al-Asaad and displayed his
5. See Dexter Filkins, ISIS in Palmyra, NEW YORKER (May 21, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/isis-in-palmyra.
6. See id.
7. Tim McGirk, Syrians Race to Save Ancient City’s Treasures from ISIS,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (July 10, 2015), http://news.nationalgeo-
graphic.com/2015/07/150710-palmyra-syria-isis-looting-museum-archaeol-
ogy/.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Kareem Shaheen, Beheaded Syrian Scholar Refused to Lead Isis to Hid-
den Palmyra Antiquities, GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2015/aug/18/isis-beheads-archaeologist-syria.
14. Frederick Deknatel, The Senseless Death of Mr. Palmyra: The War on
Culture Unfolding in Syria, and the 83-Year-Old Archaeologist Who Became its
Latest Casualty, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 20, 2015), http://foreignpol-
icy.com/2015/08/20/the-senseless-murder-of-mr-palmyra-syria-culture-is-
lamic-state-khalid-al-asaad/.
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mutilated body on a lamppost near the ancient city.15 Prior to his
execution, militants had detained and interrogated al-Asaad for
a month in an attempt to extract the location of the hidden Pal-
myrene antiquities.16 Al-Asaad refused to cooperate.17 He died
protecting his country’s cultural heritage and the subject of his
life’s work. Following the beheading, United Nations Educa-
tional Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Director-
General Irina Bokova issued a statement saying: “They killed
him because he would not betray his deep commitment to Pal-
myra. His work will live on far beyond the reach of these extrem-
ists. They murdered a great man, but they will never silence his-
tory.”18 As ISIS continues to attempt to “silence history”19 in
Syria, the dire need for an effective international legal response
intensifies.
The ongoing civil war in Syria, which began in 2011, has led to
the loss of a significant amount of cultural heritage.20 The vola-
tility has been especially severe due to the rise of various non-
state militant groups that have formed to fight against the rul-
ing regime led by President Bashar al-Assad.21 The most promi-
nent, and destructive, of these non-state groups is ISIS.22 In its
15. Id.; Shaheen, supra note 13.
16. Shaheen, supra note 13.
17. Deknatel, supra note 14; Shaheen, supra note 13.
18. Director-General Irina Bokova Deplores the Loss of Two Leading Schol-
ars of Syrian Antiquity, UNITEDNATIONSEDUC., SCI. &CULTURALORG.(Aug. 19,
2015), http://en.unesco.org/news/director-general-irina-bokova-deplores-loss-
two-leading-scholars-syrian-antiquity.
19. Id.
20. See generally Ben Taub, The Real Value of the ISIS Antiquities Trade,
NEW YORKER (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-
real-value-of-the-isis-antiquities-trade; Steven Lee Myers & Nicholas Kulish,
Militants Profit from Looting of Antiquities, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2016, at A1;
Robert Fisk, Isis Profits from Destruction of Antiquities by Selling Relics to
Dealers – and then Blowing Up the Buildings They Come From to Conceal the
Evidence of Looting, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.independ-
ent.co.uk/voices/isis-profits-from-destruction-of-antiquities-by-selling-relics-
to-dealers-and-then-blowing-up-the-10483421.html.
21. For background information on the development of modern Syria, the
Assad Government, and tensions that led to the 2011 uprisings, see William R.
Polk, Understanding Syria: From Pre-Civil War to Post-Assad, ATLANTIC (Dec.
10, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/under-
standing-syria-from-pre-civil-war-to-post-assad/281989/.
22. See infra Part II.A; see also Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ar-
chive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/; Syria: The Story of the Conflict,
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ideological fight to reinstate the Islamic Caliphate to rule Iraq
and the Levant under Islamic law,23 ISIS has committed innu-
merable atrocious acts that violate the laws of war. One such
atrocity is ISIS’ exploitation of Syrian cultural property.24 Since
gaining prominence in Syria in early 2014, ISIS has destroyed
numerous ancient ruins as acts of propaganda and has engaged
in the looting of many archaeological sites to finance its organi-
zation.25
The primary international treaties protecting cultural herit-
age during armed conflict have failed to protect antiquities from
acts of terrorism such as those employed by ISIS. In the post-
9/11 context of modern armed conflict terrorist groups often act
outside the event of declared war, thus evading many interna-
tional regulations, including cultural heritage protections. The
primary international cultural heritage protections during
armed conflict are promulgated by UNESCO and consist of the
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property Dur-
ing the Event of Armed Conflict (“1954 Hague Convention”),26
the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (“First Protocol”),27 and
the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Pro-
tection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
(“Second Protocol”).28 These treaties contain several weaknesses
preventing them from effectively protecting antiquities during
modern warfare. First, the treaties do not definitively apply to
non-state actors, and, as such, the destruction and looting com-
mitted by ISIS does not actually violate the treaties. Second, the
BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
26116868.
23. Id.
24. Myers & Kulish, supra note 20; Taub, supra note 20; Fisk, supra note
20; Rick Gladstone & Maher Samaan, Islamic State Destroys More Artifacts in
Iraq and Syria, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2015, at A3.
25. Amr Al Azm, The Pillaging of Syria’s Cultural Heritage, MIDDLE EAST
INST. (May 22, 2015), http://www.mei.edu/content/at/pillaging-syrias-cultural-
heritage.
26. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240.
27. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358 [hereinafter First
Protocol].
28. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S.
212 [hereinafter Second Protocol].
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treaties’ definition of “armed conflict” is too narrow, limiting
their application to periods of declared war, thus excluding ran-
dom acts of terrorism from their scope. Third, the treaties lack
synergy and coordination with other cultural heritage protec-
tions, namely the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership
of Cultural Property (“1970 UNESCO Convention”),29 delaying
the effective response time to recognize and seize looted antiqui-
ties once they begin appearing on the international market.
Fourth, the treaties have failed to establish effective safekeeping
provisions for the transfer and storage of artifacts known to have
originated from a conflict zone, such as Syria, thus possibly al-
lowing seized antiquities to reenter foreign markets. Addressing
these weaknesses would significantly increase the effectiveness
of international cultural heritage protections. Accordingly, it is
imperative that the international community strengthen regu-
lations governing the protection and trade of cultural property
in order to prevent the destruction of more invaluable cultural
heritage and to limit a significant source of ISIS financing. The
most effective means of strengthening these regulations is
through the promulgation of a Third Protocol to the 1954 Hague
Convention.
This Note will examine the international legal framework that
currently governs the protection of cultural heritage and will
propose additions to this framework that aim to strengthen her-
itage protections in consideration of the prominent role of non-
state actors in modern armed conflict. The analysis will focus on
the 1954 Hague Convention30 and its First31 and Second Proto-
cols.32 To more effectively protect antiquities during modern
armed conflict, a Third Protocol should be promulgated to in-
29. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Im-
port, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970,
823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention].
30. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26.
31. First Protocol, supra note 27.
32. Second Protocol, supra note 28.
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clude several provisions missing from the 1954 Hague Conven-
tion and its First and Second Protocols.33 First, the Third Proto-
col will firmly establish its application to non-state actors, which
will hold organizations such as ISIS legally accountable for the
destruction and looting of cultural heritage. Second, the Third
Protocol will expand the definition of armed conflict to not only
include an event of declared war but also sporadic acts of vio-
lence or terrorism committed against cultural heritage.34 Third,
the Third Protocol will limit the value of illicit antiquities by pro-
hibiting the sale or transfer of antiquities without provenance or
assurance of good title and would impose criminal penalties on
those caught dealing or buying stolen antiquities known to have
originated from a conflict zone. Finally, the Third Protocol will
establish guidelines for the storage of seized cultural objects
originating from a conflict zone, which will both protect antiqui-
ties until the end of the conflict and prevent them from reenter-
ing illicit markets.
Part I will first provide general background on antiquities loot-
ing and will then discuss the early history of antiquities protec-
tions. Part II will analyze the evolution of ISIS in Syria and its
use of the illicit antiquities market as a source of financing. Part
II will then examine the damage and looting of Syrian cultural
heritage by ISIS, specifically focusing on the ancient city of Pal-
myra, a World Heritage Site that has intermittently been under
ISIS occupation since 2015.35 Part III will examine the interna-
tional legal framework governing the protection of antiquities,
33. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26; First Protocol, supra note 27; Second Protocol,
supra note 28.
34. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26, art. 18; Second Protocol, supra note 28, art. 22.
35. Syrian Arab Republic, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG.,
http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/SY/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2017); Kareem
Shaheen, Palmyra: Historic Syrian City Falls Under Control of Isis, GUARDIAN
(May 21, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/20/syrian-city-
of-palmyra-falls-under-control-of-isis; Andrew Curry, Here Are the Ancient
Sites ISIS has Damaged and Destroyed, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 1, 2015),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/09/150901-isis-destruction-looting-
ancient-sites-iraq-syria-archaeology/; Rick Gladstone, Ancient City of Palmyra
Swings Back to Syrian Government Control, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/02/world/middleeast/palmyra-syria-con-
trol.html.
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including the 1954 Hague Convention, its First and Second Pro-
tocols, the 1970 UNESCO Convention, and recent antiquities
protections issued by the U.N. Security Council. Part III will
conclude with an analysis of Syrian Antiquities Law. Finally,
Part IV will assess the failure of the international and Syrian
legal framework to effectively protect antiquities in the context
of modern warfare involving non-state actors. Part IV will finish
by describing provisions to be included in the Third Protocol to
the 1954 Hague Convention to better protect antiquities during
modern armed conflict.36
I. AN EXAMINATION OF LOOTING AND EARLY CULTURAL
HERITAGE PROTECTIONS
This Part will explore the historical development of the looting
of archaeological materials and the factors fueling its persis-
tence, including traditional customs of war as well as the sym-
bolic, historical, and financial value that antiquities possess.
This Part will then discuss the earliest codified cultural heritage
protections and will conclude by examining the negative impact
of looting on archaeological research.
A. The History of Looting and Destruction of Cultural Heritage
Looting of archaeological material has been a common, and
even customary, aspect of war throughout human history.37
Looting during warfare historically served a range of purposes,
including compensation for military service, nationalist inter-
ests, and establishing social superiority.38 Ancient armies, for
36. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26; First Protocol, supra note 27; Second Protocol,
supra note 28.
37. See Patty Gerstenblith, From Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the
Preservation of Cultural Heritage at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 37 GEO.
J. INT’L. L. 245, 248–59 (2006); Robert Bejesky, A Theorization on Equity: Trac-
ing Causal Responsibility for Missing Iraqi Antiquities and Piercing Official
Immunity, 27 PACE INT’LL.REV. 397, 401 (2015); see alsoMorag M. Kersel, The
Lure of the Artefact? The Effects of Acquiring Eastern Mediterranean Material
Culture, in THE CAMBRIDGE PREHISTORY OF THE BRONZE AND IRON AGE
MEDITERRANEAN 367, 368 (A. Bernard Knapp & Peter Van Dommelen eds.,
2015).
38. Gerstenblith, supra note 37, at 248–59; Bejesky, supra note 37, at 399–
401; see also Kersel, supra note 37, at 368. Referencing Edward Said’s Orien-
talism, Kersel describes the role that antiquities can play in representing colo-
nial or “Western” superiority, citing Napoleon’s use of looted antiquities from
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example, often pillaged during wartime to compensate sol-
diers.39 In more recent history, Napoléon excessively pillaged
conquered territories, justifying his actions on the notion of
French superiority.40 British armies also stole valuable antiqui-
ties from their colonial territories in Egypt and India.41 None-
theless, as early as the second century BCE, the Romans consid-
ered the idea that at least some cultural heritage merited pro-
tection during war.42 The Roman historian Polybius, for exam-
ple, questioned excessive pillaging after Rome’s siege of the
Kingdom of Syracuse in 214–212 BCE, stating that “[Roman sol-
diers] should not strip cities under the idea that the misfortunes
of others are an ornament to their own country.”43 Building on
ideas developed by the Romans, many scholars and philosophers
during the Middle Ages and Renaissance condemned the pillag-
ing of culturally significant objects and buildings during war-
time.44 Despite this kind of widespread condemnation through-
out history, looting has persisted into the modern era, but has
nonetheless been tempered by the legal codification of cultural
heritage protections enacted during the latter half of the nine-
teenth century.
In 1863, the first codified protections of cultural heritage
emerged in the United States as part of a general law governing
military conduct during war, known as the Lieber Code.45 Arti-
cles 31 through 36 of the Lieber Code generally prohibit seizure
Egypt and the Levant as trophies attesting his domination over the regions.
Kersel, supra note 37 (citing EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978)). Furthermore,
Kersel describes the role antiquities play in the social superiority of the collec-
tor in their own community. Id. at 368.
39. Gerstenblith, supra note 37, at 249.
40. Id. at 251–54; Bejesky, supra note 37, at 399–400.
41. Bejesky, supra note 37, at 399–400.
42. Gerstenblith, supra note 37, at 248–51. According to Gerstenblith, the
Romans believed that they should spare at least some cultural property that
served religious purposes. Id. The questioning of excessive pillage appeared in
the writings of prominent Romans such as Polybius, Cicero, and Pliny. Id. Cic-
ero’s writings were known during the Middle Ages and Renaissance, and thus
possibly influenced the continued acceptance of the notion of cultural heritage
protection. See id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 253–54.
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of cultural property and mandate that cultural buildings be se-
cured against all avoidable injury.46 Over thirty years later, in
1899, the first substantive international protections of cultural
heritage during wartime were codified in Convention (II) Re-
specting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (“1899 Hague
Convention”).47 Similar to the Lieber Code, Articles 28, 47, and
56 of the 1899 Hague Convention prohibit pillaging and inten-
tional damage to cultural and historic buildings.48 Several years
later, in 1907, the international community expanded on the
1899 Hague Convention, providing more detailed protections in
the Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land (“1907 Hague Convention”).49Adding to the general pro-
hibition against pillaging in the 1899 Hague Convention, Article
27 of the 1907 Hague Convention mandates parties to take “all
steps necessary” to spare cultural buildings during war.50 Fur-
ther, Article 27 places an obligation on the besieged party to in-
dicate the presence of such buildings with distinctive signage.51
Significantly, the 1907 Hague Convention is considered custom-
ary international law and thus applies to all international ac-
tors, not just states.52 Nonetheless, the 1907 Hague Convention
represents only the beginning of international attempts to pre-
vent the looting and destruction of antiquities during wartime.
B. The Substantive Damage of Looting
Looting of cultural artifacts has persisted primarily due to con-
tinued demand for these items in the art marketplace.53 While
46. The Lieber Code of 1863, Instructions for the Government of Armies of
the United States in the Field, Series III, Vol. 3, sec. 124, General Orders no.
100, arts. 31–36 (Apr. 24, 1863); see also Gerstenblith, supra note 37, at 253–
55.
47. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land
and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
July 29, 1899, 187 Consol. T.S. 429 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention].
48. Id. arts. 28, 47, 56.
49. Id.; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
and its Annex: Regulation Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, 187 Consol. T.S. 227 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention].
50. Id. art. 27.
51. Id.
52. Marina Lostal, Syria’s World Cultural Heritage and Individual Crimi-
nal Responsibility, INT’L REV. LAW, Apr. 2015, at 7,
http://www.qscience.com/doi/abs/10.5339/irl.2015.3.
53. See Kersel, supra note 37, at 367–68.
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reasons for this demand have varied throughout history, one
theme persists—the ability of a cultural piece to symbolize a
greater religious, historical, nationalistic, or social signifi-
cance.54 The history embodied in the artifact contributes to its
perceived beauty and value in the international art market.55
The art market, in contrast with archaeological experts, typi-
cally “sets a higher price on art masterpieces than on the acqui-
sition of archaeological knowledge.”56 Thus, the superficial his-
torical symbolism that gives value to looted antiquities in the art
market outweighs the academic value archeologists derive from
in situ antiquities.57 Further, reproductions or copies are inca-
pable of possessing this historical symbolism and thus do not
have the same value as an authentic antiquity. Accordingly, loot-
ers continue to reap profits from selling authentic antiquities,
posing significant challenges for instituting effective law and
policy to prevent their illegal excavation.
Looting antiquities can cause irreparable damage. First, most
looted antiquities originate from developing countries and end
up in Western art markets, museums, and private collections.58
This not only exploits developing countries but also prevents
people from those countries from enjoying their own cultural
heritage. Second, looting leads to the undocumented excavation
of the artifacts, which removes a significant amount of infor-
mation that archaeologists can derive from them. An in situ ar-
tifact provides information about its age, culture, function, and
much more.59 As such, looting can significantly cripple archaeo-
logical research.
Looting remains a significant problem. In Robert Bejesky’s
study on looted Iraqi antiquities following the 2003 U.S. inva-
sion, he reported that “between eighty and ninety-five percent of
antiquities on the market lack[ed] sufficient documentation.”60
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 275, 302 (1982).
57. Translated from Latin, in situmeans “in the natural or original position
or place.” In situ, MERRIAM-WEBSTERDICTIONARY (2016). For more information
on archaeological excavation and conservation, see Frank Matero, Heritage,
Conservation, and Archaeology: An Introduction, ARCHAEOLOGICAL INST. AM.
(June 18, 2008), https://www.archaeological.org/news/hca/89.
58. Bator, supra note 56.
59. SeeMatero, supra note 57.
60. Bejesky, supra note 37, at 399–401.
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The rise of non-state actors, such as ISIS, who loot and sell an-
tiquities as a source of financing, likely have further contributed
to this figure.61
II. THEDESTRUCTION AND LOOTING OF SYRIAN CULTURAL
HERITAGE
Syria is home to many archaeological sites due to its continued
human occupation since the Middle Paleolithic period, including
six UNESCO World Heritage Sites.62 All of Syria’s World Herit-
age sites have been threatened since the beginning of the Syrian
conflict.63 This Part will first examine the evolution of ISIS in
Syria and its antiquities department. This Part will then discuss
the damage ISIS has inflicted on Syrian antiquities. It will pri-
marily focus on theWorld Heritage Site of Palmyra64 due to ISIS’
intermittent occupation of the city beginning in May 2015 and
its widely publicized destruction of Palmyra’s ancient temples.65
Finally, this Part will examine evidence of looting by ISIS and
61. Myers & Kulish, supra note 20.
62. These sites include: the Ancient City of Aleppo, the Ancient City of
Bosra, the Ancient City of Damascus, the Ancient Site of Palmyra, the Ancient
Villages of Northern Syria, Crac des Chevaliers, and Qal’at Salah El-Din. See
Syrian Arab Republic, supra note 35. According to UNESCO, a World Heritage
Site is considered to be of “outstanding value to humanity.” About World Her-
itage, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG.,
http://whc.unesco.org/en/about/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2017). To be designated as
a World Heritage Site, a state party to the Convention Concerning the Protec-
tion of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage must follow the procedures
outlined in the treaty to apply for designation of its culturally significant sites
asWorld Heritage Sites. An elected committee then decides on the designation.
The designation as a World Heritage Site allows a state party to receive finan-
cial assistance in preserving and protecting the site. Convention for the Pro-
tection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16 1972, 1037 U.N.T.S.
151 [hereinafter World Heritage Convention]; David Kohn, Isis’s Looting Cam-
paign, NEW YORKER (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/tech/ele-
ments/isis-looting-campaign-iraq-syria; Syria, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Syria#toc29902 (last visited Feb. 4, 2017).
63. Ancient History, Modern Destruction: Assessing the Current Status of
Syria’s World Heritage Sites Using High-Resolution Satellite Imagery, AM.
ASSOC. ADVANCEMENT SCI. (2016), https://www.aaas.org/page/ancient-history-
modern-destruction-assessing-current-status-syria-s-world-heritage-sites-us-
ing.
64. Syrian Arab Republic, supra note 35.
65. Shaheen, supra note 35; Curry, supra note 35. See generally Syria Civil
War: Assad Hails Palmyra Recapture from IS, BBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35906568.
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the presence of looted Syrian antiquities on the international an-
tiquities market.
A. ISIS, Cultural Heritage, and the Antiquities Trade
Despite the graphic and often violent images permeating
through the U.S. news media, ISIS’ ideology stems from a con-
crete set of beliefs with roots in an established Sunni school of
Islamic thought.66 In its quest to return to traditional Islam,
ISIS often resorts to extreme violence in order to establish its
authority over the populace in its territory.67 ISIS bases its ide-
ology on the earliest teachings and practices of the Prophet Mo-
hammed.68 The primary objective of ISIS is to restore the Islamic
Caliphate that ruled the Middle East for over six hundred years
following the Prophet Mohammed’s death in 632 CE.69 The res-
toration of the caliphate necessarily involves the restoration of
Islamic law, thus bringing seventh century legal and societal
norms into the twenty-first century, many of which may appear
barbaric in a modern context.70 In June 2014 ISIS declared a ca-
liphate over the territory it controlled in Iraq and Syria, with its
leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as Caliph.71 In accordance with the
establishment of the caliphate, ISIS began organizing govern-
ment departments and services, including a division dedicated
to antiquities.72
Related to ISIS’ mission to reestablish the Islamic Caliphate
is the destruction of antiquities for broader ideological purposes,
as much of Syria’s ancient archaeological record does not support
its preferred narrative of Islamic Syrian and Levantine his-
tory.73 Beyond these ideological differences, ISIS has plundered
Syrian antiquities because of the immense potential for profit
66. Wood, supra note 22.
67. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), supra note 4.
68. Id.
69. The Caliphate ruled the Islamic Empire from 632 CE to 1258 CE. See
Caliphate, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/place/Cali-
phate (last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
70. Wood, supra note 22.
71. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), supra note 4.
72. Id.; Andrew Keller, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Counter Threat Fin. &
Sanctions, Bureau of Econ. & Bus. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Documenting
ISIL’s Antiquities Trafficking: The Looting and Destruction of Iraqi and Syrian
Cultural Heritage: What We Know and What Can Be Done (Sept. 29, 2015).
73. ISIS instead prefers to focus on the region’s Islamic history. See gener-
allyWood, supra note 22.
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from the already thriving antiquities trade.74 The institutional-
ized nature of ISIS’ antiquities department illustrates the extent
to which the organization’s looting has been used as a source of
financing. Documents recovered from a U.S. raid on the com-
pound of Abu Sayyaf, ISIS’ director of oil and gas and antiquities
divisions, revealed the scope of ISIS’ antiquities department.75
Specifically, the documents outlined the structure of the divi-
sion, showing segments dedicated to research and exploration of
potential archaeological sites, excavations, and marketing of an-
tiquities.76 Furthermore, U.S. forces found scaled photographs of
intact antiquities that most likely were intended for sale.77
While exact figures are unknown, the U.S. government esti-
mates that ISIS has made several million dollars on the illicit
sale of looted antiquities since mid-2014.78 The large swaths of
territory ISIS now occupies further increases its potential for
profits as more land provides more potential for encountering
buried antiquities in a country with as rich an ancient history as
Syria.79 As such, the longer ISIS remains in control of its terri-
tory, the more endangered Syria’s cultural heritage becomes.
B. An Examination of Palmyra
Since ISIS gained territorial control in Syria, it has destroyed
and looted a significant amount of cultural heritage, including
multiple UNESCOWorld Heritage Sites and the movable antiq-
uities originating from them.80 One such World Heritage Site,
Palmyra, was seized by ISIS forces in May 2015.81 Dubbed the
74. Al Azm, supra note 25; Myers & Kulish, supra note 20.
75. Keller, supra note 72.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Al Azm, supra note 25.
80. Curry, supra note 35; see also Jen Kirby, ISIS is Waging War Against
Syria’s Ancient History, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 25, 2015), http://nymag.com/daily/in-
telligencer/2015/08/isis-is-destroying-syrias-ancient-history.html#; Jeffries,
supra note 2.
81. Shaheen, supra note 35. Since May 2015 Palmyra has fallen under and
out of ISIS control. See Gladstone, supra note 35.
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“Venice of the Sands” by archaeologist and British military of-
ficer T.E. Lawrence, the site contains some of the most well-pre-
served evidence of Roman occupation in the Near East.82
Evidence of occupation at Palmyra dates back 3,800 years;
however, the city reached its peak during the Roman period from
the first through third centuries CE.83 The site is famous for
Queen Zenobia’s rule over the city beginning around 267 CE,
during which she led a successful revolt against the Roman Em-
pire.84 Furthermore, Palmyra functioned as a major trading hub
along the Silk Road, where caravans from the east passed
through on their way to Roman provinces.85 Accordingly, the ru-
ins at Palmyra reflect the cultural diversity of the traders who
passed through.86 The unique confluence of Phoenician, Babylo-
nian, Arab, and Canaanite cultures at Palmyra is found almost
nowhere else in the world.87
During its occupation of Palmyra from May 2015 to March
2016, ISIS militants publicly destroyed multiple temples located
in the Palmyra archaeological park.88 In July 2015 ISIS mili-
tants publicly sledgehammered statues stolen from Palmyra89
and destroyed the Lion of Al-lat, a two-thousand-year-old statue
of a lion that was located outside the museum at Palmyra.90 In
82. Ishaan Tharoor,Why the Ancient City of Palmyra, Seized by the Islamic
State, Matters, WASH. POST (May 20, 2015), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/14/islamic-state-fighters-are-at-the-
gates-of-an-ancient-roman-era-city-in-syria/.
83. Kristin Romey, How Ancient Palmyra, Not in ISIS’s Grip, Grew Rich
and Powerful, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 26, 2015), http://news.nationalgeo-
graphic.com/2015/08/150826-syria-palmyra-islamic-state-isis-archaeology-his-
tory/.
84. Tharoor, supra note 82.
85. Id.
86. See id. See generally Leon Wieseltier, The Rubble of Palmyra, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 4, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ar-
chive/2015/09/rubble-palmyra-syria-isis/403921/.
87. Romey, supra note 83.
88. Curry, supra note 35; Fisk, supra note 20. See generally Rachel Shabi,
Looted in Syria – and Sold in London: The British Antiquities Shops Dealing
in Artefacts Smuggled by Isis, GUARDIAN (July 3, 2015), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2015/jul/03/antiquities-looted-by-isis-end-up-in-london-shops;
Syria Civil War: Assad Hails Palmyra Recapture from IS, supra note 65.
89. Gladstone & Samaan, supra note 24.
90. Isis Militants Destroy 2,000-year-old Statue of Lion at Palmyra,
GUARDIAN (July 2, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/02/isis-
militants-destroy-palmyra-stone-lion-al-lat.
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August 2015 ISIS militants set off explosions at the Temple of
Baalshamin, which was built around two thousand years ago as
a dedication to the Phoenician god Baalshamin.91 A week later,
ISIS militants destroyed the main Temple of Baal and a row of
columns in its immediate vicinity.92 ISIS’ demolition of these im-
moveable cultural properties was distinct from its pillaging of
sites for profit in that it was motivated by ideological opposition
to pre-Islamic symbols of paganism.93 Nonetheless, ISIS ap-
peared to have slowed its destruction during its first occupation
from May 2015 to March 2016, fearing revolt by the local popu-
lation.94
C. Antiquities Looting: From Syria to the International Art
Market
When Syrian forces regained control of Palmyra in March
2016, they found significant damage to the Palmyra Museum.95
Although museum employees transported many of the artifacts
out of the city before ISIS’ arrival, many others remained.96 Ev-
idence suggests that ISIS deliberately destroyed sculptures, and
many artifacts were torn from their mountings.97 Although no
direct evidence exists proving ISIS sold these missing artifacts,
ISIS’ practice of selling antiquities to finance its activities sug-
gests the artifacts were likely sold.98 Documents recovered by
U.S. forces from the raid of Abu Sayyaf, the director of ISIS’ oil
and gas and antiquities division, demonstrate that ISIS devotes
significant resources to finance its antiquities trafficking with
91. Liam Stack, Islamic State Blows Up Temple at Palmyra Ruins in Syria,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2015, at A6.
92. Anne Barnard & Hwaida Saad, U.N. Confirms Destruction of Ancient
Temple by ISIS, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2015, at A7 (“Consecrated in A.D. 32 to
the Semitic god Baal, the temple is considered one of the most important sites
at Palmyra. It was a relatively intact example of the fusion of Middle Eastern,
Greek and Roman influences.”); Jeffries, supra note 2.
93. See Stack, supra note 91; Kohn, supra note 62; Kareem Fahim, Scenes
from Palmyra Indicate ISIS Slowed Assault on Treasures, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2016, at A8.
94. Fahim, supra note 93.
95. Id.
96. Dana Ballout, Palmyra Museum: Photos Reveal the Treasures Lost,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/palmyra-museum-
photos-reveal-the-treasures-lost-1459284776.
97. Id.
98. Keller, supra note 72.
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the goal of reaping a profit.99 United States forces recovered re-
ceipts from antiquities sales, authorizations for excavations, and
documents showing that ISIS receives a 20 percent tax from the
proceeds of looting.100 Further, the documents revealed that the
antiquities division has specific units dedicated to exploration of
archaeological sites and marketing antiquities.101
Many sites in ISIS-controlled areas have been so heavily looted
that satellite images of the areas resemble Swiss cheese due to
holes dug by looters in search of antiquities.102 Once excavated,
the antiquities are usually transported through Lebanon and
Turkey, from which they enter into European and U.S. mar-
kets.103 During their transport, the smugglers assign the antiq-
uities falsified documents asserting provenance.104 Other antiq-
uities that are transported without such documentation are of-
ten claimed to have originated from long-held private collec-
tions.105
Recent reports on the website of the Directorate-General of An-
tiquities and Museums (DGAM), the Syrian government agency
in charge of managing Syria’s archaeological sites and muse-
ums,106 revealed recovered Palmyrene antiquities that were in-
tended for sale in the international art market. Absent accurate
documentation, it is nearly impossible to discover when these
antiquities were illegally excavated from Palmyra, or whether
ISIS was responsible. Nonetheless, many items originating from
Palmyra have appeared on the international art market after
ISIS began its first occupation in May 2015. In January 2016,
DGAM reported that a Palmyrene limestone head was listed for
sale at a gallery in New York.107 The piece acquired false prove-
nance documents asserting that it came from a private New
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Kohn, supra note 62.
103. Id.; Shabi, supra note 88.
104. Shabi, supra note 88.
105. Id.
106. See generally Syrian Arab Republic, Ministry of Culture: Dir.-Gen. of
Antiquities & Museums, GOV.SY, http://www.dgam.gov.sy/ (last visited Mar. 8,
2017).
107. Syrian Arab Republic, Ministry of Culture: Dir.-Gen. of Antiquities &
Museums, Selling Ancient Palmyran Head in One of Antiquities Auctions,
GOV.SY (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.dgam.gov.sy/index.php?d=314&id=2111.
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York collection originating from Israel.108 DGAM reported the
sale to Interpol to stop the auction and retrieve the artifact.109
Further, in March 2016 DGAM reported that Swiss authorities
recovered relics originating from Palmyra.110 Additionally, in
October 2016 DGAM reported the recovery of a set of four Pal-
myrene funerary busts, likely intended for sale, from ISIS head-
quarters in Palmyra during its first occupation from May 2015
to March 2016.111 These reports, however, only address recov-
ered Palmyrene artifacts and likely represent only a fraction of
the overall number of illicit Syrian artifacts on the international
art market.
In July 2015 an investigative report by the London-based
newspaper, The Guardian, revealed the scale of illicitly traf-
ficked antiquities from ISIS-controlled areas of Syria in the
United Kingdom.112 In the report, Mark Altaweel, a Near East
specialist at the University College London Institute of Archae-
ology, posed as an antiquities collector and sought out London
dealers selling Syrian antiquities.113 While examining a collec-
tion in one small dealer’s shop, The Guardian reporter Rachel
Shabi observed: “Every time Altaweel zones in on something
that seems likely to be from an area now controlled by Isis, the
dealer we’re talking to grows vague about the item’s origin. . . .
There is never any paperwork.”114 Altaweel claims the pieces
were “so distinctive that they could only have come from a par-
ticular part of the region: the part now controlled by the so-called
Islamic State.”115 As ISIS gains more territorial control, the op-
eration will likely grow in sophistication,116 and, as such, it is
imperative that the international community update the inter-
national legal framework to prevent the loss of even more price-
less antiquities.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Syrian Arab Republic, Ministry of Culture: Dir.-Gen. of Antiquities &
Museums, Looted Palmyra Relics Seized by Swiss Authorities, GOV.SY (Mar.
12, 2016), http://www.dgam.gov.sy/index.php?d=314&id=2119.
111. Syrian Arab Republic, Ministry of Culture: Dir.-Gen. of Antiquities &
Museums, A Set of Palmyrene Funerary Busts, GOV.SY (Oct. 11, 2016),
http://www.dgam.gov.sy/index.php?d=314&id=2097.
112. Shabi, supra note 88.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Kohn, supra note 62; Keller, supra note 72.
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKGOVERNING THE
PROTECTION OF ANTIQUITIES
This Part will examine the development of international law
governing the protection of antiquities. It will begin by discuss-
ing the 1954 Hague Convention and its First and Second Proto-
cols, which provide the primary cultural heritage protections
during armed conflict.117 This Part will then examine the 1970
UNESCO Convention and will follow by highlighting the most
recent actions taken by the United Nations to protect antiqui-
ties, namely Resolution 2199 and the 2003 Declaration Concern-
ing the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage (“2003 Dec-
laration”).118 Finally, this Part will conclude with an examina-
tion of Syrian law governing the protection of antiquities.
A. The 1954 Hague Convention and its First Protocol
The international community has long recognized the im-
portance of protecting cultural property during armed conflict.
Some of the earliest modern codified international protections of
cultural heritage were enacted as part of the 1907 Hague Con-
vention.119 The 1907 Hague Convention, however, regulated a
range of conduct during wartime, with cultural heritage protec-
tions enumerated in only a few articles. Accordingly, the 1954
Hague Convention established the most significant cultural her-
itage protections in modern history.120 The 1954 Hague Conven-
tion represents the first time the international community rec-
ognized the need for protection of cultural property per se, and
117. Second Protocol, supra note 28.
118. S.C. Res. 2199, ¶¶ 15–17 (Feb. 12, 2015); U.N. Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] Declaration Concerning Intentional De-
struction of Cultural Heritage, Oct. 17, 2003, UNESCODoc. 32/C/Res/33 [here-
inafter 2003 Declaration].
119. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 49, arts. 27, 47, 56.
120. Lostal, supra note 52, at 8.
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not merely as a subset of international humanitarian protec-
tions.121 In May 1954 UNESCO opened the 1954 Hague Conven-
tion for signing, eventually acquiring the signatures of 126 U.N.
Member States.122
The 1954 Hague Convention recognizes the significance of cul-
tural property as common to all humanity, thus necessitating
international protection.123 It provides a set of regulations both
mandating protection of cultural heritage in peace time and also
prohibiting the destruction of moveable and immoveable cul-
tural property during armed conflicts.124 Further, scholars have
suggested that the articles requiring the protection of cultural
property represent customary international law, which would
render them applicable to all international actors, not just Mem-
ber States to the treaty.125
The 1954 Hague Convention mandates that state parties take
several measures during peacetime to prevent the destruction of
cultural heritage during armed conflict. First, Article 3 of the
1954 Hague Convention mandates that state parties take
measures “they consider appropriate” to safeguard cultural
property during times of peace against the “foreseeable effects of
an armed conflict.”126 Article 3, however, never articulates in de-
tail what measures states should take. The Second Protocol
121. Ariel W. Gonzalez, Great Expectations? Towards an Effective Applica-
tion of the Regime of Enhanced Protection in the Second Protocol to the Hague
Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
flict, in PROTECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY IN ARMED CONFLICT: AN INSIGHT INTO
THE 1999 SECOND PROTOCOL TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1954 FOR THE
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT 59, 59
(Nout van Woudenberg & Liesbeth Lijnzaad eds., 2010).
122. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Customary International Humanitarian Law, INT’L COMMITTEE RED
CROSS (Oct. 29, 2010), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/customary-interna-
tional-humanitarian-law-0. The International Court of Justice, however, has
not definitively established the 1954 Hague Convention as customary interna-
tional law. Bejesky, supra note 37, at 406; Gerstenblith, supra note 37, at 299–
300; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitar-
ian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law
in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’LREV. RED CROSS 175, 178 (2005)).
126. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26, art. 3.
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would later clarify this issue.127 Article 7 of the 1954 Hague Con-
vention, on the other hand, more specifically mandates that
state parties train their military during peacetime in recogniz-
ing, protecting, and preventing destruction of cultural herit-
age.128
Articles 4 through 17 of the 1954 Hague Convention apply dur-
ing wartime and occupation.129 Article 4 prohibits a warring
party from targeting any monument designated as cultural her-
itage and from using cultural property for any purpose likely to
expose it to destruction or damage.130 Paragraph 2 of Article 4,
however, contains a significant loophole, releasing a state party
from its Article 4 obligations in cases of “military necessity,”
without defining what actually constitutes military necessity.131
The Second Protocol would later attempt to fix this issue by more
clearly articulating situations of military necessity.132 Article 5
of the 1954 Hague Convention goes on to describe obligations of
a state party during occupation,133 although the treaty never ac-
tually defines occupation. Additionally, Article 5 imposes very
weak obligations, merely mandating that the occupying party
support and collaborate with the “competent national authori-
ties” to safeguard and preserve cultural heritage.134 Articles 8
through 14 describe a regime of “special protection” for antiqui-
ties threatened during an armed conflict.135 The provision is de-
signed to protect “refuges” sheltering cultural heritage during
armed conflict and “immovable cultural heritage of very great
importance.”136 The regime of special protection, however, has
rarely been used due to its requirement that the refuge or cul-
tural heritage building be located an “adequate distance” from
any large industrial center or important military objective,
127. Second Protocol, supra note 28, art. 5; see also infra Part III.B.
128. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26, art. 7.
129. Id. arts. 7–14.
130. Id. art. 4.
131. Id.
132. Second Protocol, supra note 28, art. 6; see also infra Part III.B.
133. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26, art. 5.
134. Id.
135. Id. arts. 8–14.
136. Id.
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which severely limits the number of refuges or important cul-
tural buildings that qualify under the treaty.137 The Second Pro-
tocol would later remove this distance requirement in its regime
of enhanced protection.138
Articles 18 and 19 deal with the jurisdictional application of
the convention. These articles also prove largely ineffective for
several reasons. First, Article 18 states that the 1954 Hague
Convention only applies during the event of a declared war or
occupation, thus excluding random acts of terrorism, one of the
most common methods of warfare post-9/11.139 Second, Article
19 imposes little to no obligations on non-state parties during
noninternational armed conflicts.140Under Article 19, all parties
in noninternational conflicts, presumably including non-state
parties due to the provision’s use of a lowercase “p,” must apply
the provisions of the convention which relate to “respect” for cul-
tural property.141 It does not, however, state which provisions
relate to respect for cultural property, leaving unclear which
specific obligations apply to non-state actors like ISIS during
noninternational armed conflicts. In addition, paragraph 2 of Ar-
ticle 19 states that, absent any kind of “special agreement,” the
convention only applies to state parties in noninternational
armed conflicts.142 Thus, in order for the entirety of the 1954
Hague Convention to apply to a non-state actor such as ISIS, a
non-state actor would have to enter into an agreement with the
state party to the convention with whom it may be at war, which
is unlikely. Accordingly, while the entirety of the 1954 Hague
Convention could use improvement, the weaknesses embodied
137. Id.; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, New Rules for the Protection of Cultural
Property in Armed Conflict, in PROTECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY IN ARMED
CONFLICT: AN INSIGHT INTO THE 1999 SECOND PROTOCOL TO THE HAGUE
CONVENTIONOF 1954 FOR THEPROTECTIONOFCULTURALPROPERTY IN THEEVENT
OF ARMED CONFLICT 21, 31–32 (Nout van Woudenberg & Liesbeth Lijnzaad
eds., 2010).
138. See Second Protocol, supra note 28, arts. 10–14; see also infra Part III.B.
139. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26, art. 18. See generally Laurie R. Blank & Benja-
min R. Farley, Identifying the Start of Conflict: Conflict Recognition, Opera-
tional Realities and Accountability in the Post-9/11 World, 36 MICH. J. INT’LL.
467 (2015).
140. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26, art. 19.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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in Articles 18 and 19 constitute the primary barriers preventing
the 1954 Hague Convention from effectively protecting cultural
heritage from ISIS in the Syrian conflict.
In conjunction with the 1954 Hague Convention, UNESCO is-
sued the First Protocol.143 The First Protocol was promulgated
primarily as a reaction to the extensive pillaging that occurred
by occupying powers during World War II.144 The First Protocol
primarily focuses on moveable cultural property145 during peri-
ods of occupation.146 Sections I and II contain four main obliga-
tions: (1) to prevent the exportation of cultural property from a
territory occupied by the party during armed conflict, (2) to take
into custody cultural property imported into its territory from
any occupied territory, (3) to return such property to the occu-
pied territory at the end of the hostilities, and (4) to pay an in-
demnity to holders of cultural property who had to return it in
accordance with the treaty.147 The First Protocol, however, has
been largely disregarded by state parties.148 First, Article 9 al-
lows a state party to ratify the First Protocol but declare sections
I or II nonbinding. If a state party exercises this option, it effec-
tively removes most of the substantive effect of the treaty.149 Sec-
ond, state parties dislike the provision requiring removal of cul-
tural objects after the end of hostilities, as it can interfere with
their art markets.150
143. First Protocol, supra note 27.
144. See JIRI TOMAN, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT
OFARMEDCONFLICT 4 (1996); Zoe Howe, Can the 1954 Hague Convention Apply
to Non-state Actors?: A Study of Iraq and Libya, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 403, 411
(2012).
145. Examples of movable cultural property under the 1954 Hague Conven-
tion include works of art, manuscripts, books, and other objects of historical or
archaeological interest. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, supra note 26, pmbl.
146. First Protocol, supra note 27, sec. I.
147. Id.
148. Id.; Gerstenblith, supra note 37, at 264–65; Bejesky, supra note 37, at
405.
149. First Protocol, supra note 27, art. 9; Gerstenblith, supra note 37.
150. Gerstenblith, supra note 37, at 266.
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Ultimately, the 1954 Hague Convention and its First Protocol
represented a significant step forward in the protection of cul-
tural property. Nonetheless, its weaknesses were exposed in its
failure to effectively protect cultural property during several
conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s,151 and, in particular, in its fail-
ure to protect cultural property during the war in the former Yu-
goslavia,152 during which warring forces intentionally destroyed
heritage sites as military objectives,153 tragedies such as these
caused the international community to recognize that signifi-
cant improvement was needed.154
B. The 1999 Second Protocol
Recognizing the weaknesses of the 1954 Hague Convention,
the government of the Netherlands and UNESCO jointly com-
missioned a review of the treaty in the early 1990s.155 Released
in 1993, this review aimed to identify measures needed to im-
prove its effectiveness and methods by which the international
community could effectuate these improvements.156 This review
led to several other meetings and diplomatic conferences, even-
tually culminating in the promulgation of the Second Protocol to
the 1954 Hague Convention on March 29, 1999.157 The Second
151. Conflicts include the Iran-Iraq war, the conflict in the former Yugosla-
via, the first Gulf War, and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. For more
information, see Jiri Toman, The Road to the 1999 Second Protocol, in
PROTECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY IN ARMED CONFLICT: AN INSIGHT INTO THE
1999 SECOND PROTOCOL TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1954 FOR THE
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT 1, 9–12
(Nout van Woudenberg & Liesbeth Lijnzaad eds., 2010).
152. The hostilities occurred between the years 1992 and 1995. See id. at 10.
153. Id.
154. Henckaerts, supra note 137, at 21–22.
155. Id. at 21–23.
156. Id.
157. Id.; Second Protocol, supra note 28. Syria played a substantial role in
the treaty negotiations leading up to the Second Protocol and was one of fifteen
nations that commented on the proposed final draft before its adoption. JIRI
TOMAN, UNITEDNATIONSEDUC., SCI. & CULTURALORG., CULTURAL PROPERTY IN
WAR: IMPROVEMENT IN PROTECTION, COMMENTARY ON THE 1999 SECOND
PROTOCOL TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1954 FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT 715 (2009),
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001864/186496e.pdf. Furthermore, Syria was
one of the first states that signed the SecondProtocol after itwas opened for signature.
See Second Protocol, supra note 28. For reasons unknown, however, the Syrian
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Protocol includes several significant provisions that grant
stronger protections for cultural property during armed con-
flicts. First, the Second Protocol clarifies Article 3 of the 1954
Hague Convention, which establishes obligations for the protec-
tion of cultural property during peacetime.158 Article 3 mandates
that state parties take measures “they consider appropriate” to
safeguard cultural heritage against foreseeable effects of armed
conflicts, without defining what constitutes appropriate
measures.159 Article 5 of the Second Protocol clarifies that appro-
priate measures under Article 3 of the 1954 Hague Convention
include such actions as the “preparation of inventories,” “the
planning of emergency measures for protection against fire or
structural collapse,” and “preparation for the removal of movea-
ble cultural property.”160
Second, Article 6 of the Second Protocol limits the military ne-
cessity exception in paragraph 2 of Article 4 in the 1954 Hague
Convention.161 The military necessity exception of Article 4 of
the 1954 Hague Convention releases state parties from its obli-
gations to refrain from targeting cultural heritage or using it in
such a way to expose it to destruction if a state party asserts it
acted out of military necessity.162 Article 6 of the Second Proto-
col, however, limits the use of a military necessity waiver of the
Article 4 obligations to the following situations: (1) if cultural
property has been made into a military objective, (2) if there is
parliament never formally ratified the Second Protocol. Nevertheless, as a sig-
natory under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT), Syria maintains a duty to refrain from any actions that “defeat the
object and purpose of the treaty.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
158. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26, art. 3.
159. Id.
160. Second Protocol, supra note 28, art. 5; see also Henckaerts, supra note
137, at 24. The full list of measures included under Article 5 are as follows: the
preparation of inventories, the planning of emergency measures for protection
against fire or structural collapse, the preparation for the removal of movable
cultural property or the provision for adequate in situ protection of such prop-
erty, and the designation of competent authorities responsible for the safe-
guarding of cultural property. Second Protocol, supra note 28, art. 5.
161. See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26, art. 4; see also supra Part III.A.
162. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26, art. 4.
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no feasible alternative available to obtain a similar military ad-
vantage, or (3) if there is no possible choice between exposing the
cultural property to damage or obtaining the same military ad-
vantage.163 Additionally, Article 6 mandates that the decision to
invoke military necessity shall only be taken by a commanding
officer and that effective warning should be given whenever cir-
cumstances permit.164 While Article 6 still allows for significant
exceptions to cultural heritage protections in circumstances of
military necessity, the provision substantially improved upon
the even broader exceptions contained in Article 4 of the 1954
Hague Convention.
Third, Articles 10 through 14 of the Second Protocol estab-
lishes a regime of “enhanced protection” during armed conflict
to improve upon the weak and largely ineffective regime of spe-
cial protection under Articles 8 through 14 of the 1954 Hague
Convention. Most importantly, the regime of enhanced protec-
tion under the Second Protocol removed the special protection
requirement in the 1954 Hague Convention that the cultural ref-
uge or building be located an “adequate distance” from any in-
dustrial center or important military objective, thus allowing
many more cultural buildings to qualify for enhanced protec-
tion.165 For the inclusion of a piece of cultural property on the
List of Cultural Property under Enhanced Protection (the
“List”), the object must meet the following three conditions:
1. It is cultural heritage of the greatest importance for human-
ity;
2. It is protected by adequate domestic legal and administra-
tive measures recognising its exceptional cultural and historic
value and ensuring the highest level of protection;
3. It is not used for military purposes or to shield military sites
and a declaration must have been made by the Party which has
control over the cultural property, confirming that it will not
be so used.166
163. Second Protocol, supra note 28, art. 6.
164. Id.
165. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26, arts. 8–14; see also supra Part III.A.
166. Second Protocol, supra note 28, arts. 10–14.
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Once a piece of cultural heritage receives enhanced protection,
state parties are bound by an affirmative duty to ensure its
safety during armed conflict.167 The effectiveness of the List lies
in its global renown—its existence gives UNESCO leverage to
warn warring state parties that any military use of or attack on
cultural property included on the List will constitute a war
crime.168
Fourth, Article 15 of the Second Protocol clarifies in more de-
tail the individual criminal responsibility imposed by the trea-
ties.169 Article 28 of the 1954 Hague Convention mandates that
state parties draft domestic laws that impose criminal responsi-
bility on states that breach the convention.170 The 1954 Hague
Convention does not, however, list the violations that require a
criminal sanction, rendering the provision largely ineffective.171
Article 15 of the Second Protocol attempts to fix this problem by
listing the violations that carry individual criminal responsibil-
ity, including attacking a piece of cultural property under en-
hanced protection, extensive destruction of cultural property,
and theft and pillaging of cultural property, among others.172
Finally, Article 22 of the Second Protocol expands the scope of
its protections by mandating that the entire Second Protocol ap-
ply to noninternational armed conflicts.173 This constitutes a sig-
nificant improvement from the 1954 Hague Convention, which
167. Id. art. 12.
168. Henckaerts, supra note 137, at 32–33.
169. Second Protocol, supra note 28, art. 15.
170. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26, art. 28.
171. Id.; see also Henckaerts, supra note 137, at 36–37.
172. Second Protocol, supra note 28, art. 15. The full list of punishable of-
fenses under Article 15 are as follows:
making cultural property under enhanced protection the ob-
ject of attack; using cultural property under enhanced protec-
tion or its immediate surroundings in support of military ac-
tion; extensive destruction or appropriation of cultural prop-
erty protected under the Convention and this Protocol; mak-
ing cultural property protected under the Convention and
this Protocol the object of an attack; theft pillaging or misap-
propriation of, or acts of vandalism directed against cultural
property protected under the Convention.
Id.
173. Id. art. 22.
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vaguely states that provisions that “relate to respect for cultural
property” shall apply to noninternational conflicts.174 Despite
this drastic improvement contained in Article 22 of the Second
Protocol, the provision remains flawed for several reasons. First,
paragraph 2 of Article 22 states that, although the Second Pro-
tocol applies to noninternational conflicts, it does not apply to
“situations of international disturbance and tensions” or “iso-
lated and sporadic acts of violence.”175 This limitation of the Sec-
ond Protocol severely limits its effectiveness to protect cultural
property against the actions of non-state terrorist groups outside
the event of declared war, as exemplified by the Taliban’s de-
struction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in Afghanistan in 2001.176
The second significant flaw of Article 22 is its failure to clearly
indicate whether it applies to both state parties and non-state
parties in a noninternational armed conflict, even though the
nature of noninternational armed conflicts implies the partici-
pation of a non-state party. Article 22, paragraph 1 states: “This
Protocol shall apply in the event of an armed conflict not of an
international character, occurring within the territory of one of
the Parties.”177 Article 22 does not, however, state to whom the
provision applies—all parties to the noninternational conflict, or
just the state party. Furthering the confusion is the Second Pro-
tocol’s use of the uppercase term “Party” to refer to a state party
and the lowercase term “party” to refer to a non-party to the
174. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26, art. 19. Article 19 goes on to state that the par-
ties to the conflict shall, through “special agreement,” attempt to bring into
force all other provisions of the convention, which clearly implies that only a
limited number of provisions apply to conflicts of a noninternational character.
See id.; see also The Protection of Cultural Property in Non-International
Armed Conflicts, in PROTECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY IN ARMED CONFLICT: AN
INSIGHT INTO THE 1999 SECOND PROTOCOL TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1954
FOR THE PROTECTION OFCULTURAL PROPERTY IN THEEVENT OFARMEDCONFLICT
81, 82–83 (Nout van Woudenberg & Liesbeth Lijnzaad eds., 2010); supra Part
III.A.
175. Second Protocol, supra note 28, art. 22.
176. Barry Bearak,OverWorld Protests, Taliban are Destroying Ancient Bud-
dhas, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2001), http://www.ny-
times.com/2001/03/04/world/over-world-protests-taliban-are-destroying-an-
cient-buddhas.html. The 1954 Hague Convention and its Second Protocol did
not apply because the incident did not occur during a formal armed conflict.
See 2003 Declaration, supra note 118.
177. Second Protocol, supra note 28, art. 22.
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treaty.178 Significantly, Article 22 only refers to uppercase “Par-
ties,” making no mention of lowercase “parties.” Further, Arti-
cles 1 and 3 of the Second Protocol state that the treaty only ap-
plies to “States Parties” or “High Contracting Parties,” respec-
tively,179 indicating that no part of the treaty can apply to non-
state parties. In light of these provisions, Article 22 must be read
to assume that the provision only applies to state parties, as it
fails to specify otherwise.
Further support of this interpretation is found in Article 3 of
the Second Protocol. Paragraph 1 of Article 3 defines the scope
of the Second Protocol in accordance with Article 18 of the 1954
Hague Convention.180 Article 18 of the 1954 Hague Convention
explicitly states that it only applies to High Contracting Parties,
with no mention of lowercase non-state parties.181 Additionally,
paragraph 2 of Article 3 states that the Second Protocol will ap-
ply to a non-state party only if that party accepts and applies the
provisions of the protocol.182 It does not, however, mandate its
application even if the nonintentional conflict occurs within the
territory of a state party.
C. The 1970 UNESCO Convention
One of the most notable international treaties protecting cul-
tural heritage outside the scope of armed conflict is the 1970
UNESCO Convention.183 The substantive articles of the 1970
UNESCO Convention describe a series of measures countries
should take to combat the illicit looting, export, and import of
cultural property.184 The motivation for such a convention
stemmed from the recognition that large numbers of looted art
from developing countries were not only finding their way into
private collections in Europe and the United States but also into
178. See id. arts. 1 (“‘Party’ means a State Party to this Protocol.”); 3 (distin-
guishing between “Parties to the Protocol” and a “State party to the conflict
which is not bound by it [Second Protocol]”).
179. Id.
180. Id. art. 3; Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property During the
Event of Armed Conflict, supra note 26, art. 18.
181. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property During the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26, art. 18.
182. Second Protocol, supra note 28, art. 3.
183. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 29.
184. Id.; Bator, supra note 56, at 377–79.
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the halls of prestigious museums in these developed Western
countries.185
The 1970 UNESCO Convention focuses on three main areas to
protect cultural heritage: (1) preventing illicit trafficking, (2)
restitution of illegally trafficked antiquities, and (3) a frame-
work for international cooperation under circumstances in
which cultural heritage is under threat.186 Articles 7 and 9 de-
scribe the most substantive provisions of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention.187 Article 7 establishes a series of obligations bind-
ing state parties to enact necessary legislation to prevent muse-
ums and other similar institutions from acquiring illicitly ex-
ported cultural property.188 Additionally, Article 9 allows for
state parties to call for a “concerted international effort” if their
cultural patrimony is in jeopardy, including the possibility of a
coordinated effort with other state parties to help control ex-
ports, imports, and international commerce of the heritage in
jeopardy.189 Article 9, however, does not specify that a state
party take any particular measures when heritage is in jeop-
ardy; instead, it allows for an “agreement” between states to
take additional measures to prevent damage to cultural herit-
age.190 Since its promulgation, the 1970 UNESCO Convention
has proved fairly effective. Its provisions, however, are often im-
plemented separately from the treaties protecting cultural her-
itage during armed conflict. As such, improving coordination be-
tween the two treaty frameworks would improve the interna-
tional community’s ability to fight illicit trafficking of antiquities
185. Bator, supra note 56, at 279. Bator examined the impact of Dr. Clemency
Coggins’ seminal essay, which detailed the crisis of Mayan looted antiquities.
Bator emphasized the role of that essay in exposing to the art community the
notion that
[t]he respectable part of the art world could no longer pretend
that looting of ancient art was a matter involving only a few
obscure peasants, corrupt local officials, and unscrupulous
dealers. Splendid national treasures, stolen and mutilated,
could within a few years find their way into the halls of Amer-
ica’s most sumptuous museums.
Id. at 280.
186. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 29.
187. Id. arts. 7–9; Bator, supra note 56, at 377–78.
188. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 29, art. 7.
189. Id. art. 9.
190. Id.
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originating from conflict zones because it would impose on state
parties the obligation to seize and prohibit the sale of antiquities
likely originating from a particular conflict zone at the outbreak
of an armed conflict.
D. Recent International Actions Protecting Antiquities
The U.N. Security Council has also passed resolutions in direct
response to the outbreak of both the Iraq and Syrian conflicts.
In February 2015 the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution
2199 in response to the current situation in Syria.191 Resolution
2199 condemns ISIS’ destruction of cultural heritage in Iraq and
Syria, expresses concern over ISIS’ looting of cultural property
to generate income, and calls uponUNESCO to aid in preventing
the destruction of cultural property by ISIS.192 Resolution 2199
represents an important step in the international community’s
recognition of the need for action in the protection of cultural
property in Syria. While U.N. Security Council resolutions are
generally considered legally binding,193 Resolution 2199 does not
offer any substantive increase in protections, and thus is ulti-
mately insufficient for adequately updating cultural heritage
protections.
Similar to U.N. Security Council Resolution 2199, in October
2003 UNESCO issued a declaration in response to the tragic de-
struction of cultural heritage by the Taliban, a non-state group
operating in Afghanistan.194 In 2001, the Taliban destroyed the
Buddhas of Bamiyan in central Afghanistan, which were con-
structed before the introduction of Islam by Buddhists, who oc-
cupied the area during the sixth century CE.195 According to the
Taliban leader at the time, Mullah Muhammad Omar, they de-
stroyed the Buddhas because they represented the “gods of the
infidels.”196 In response to the destruction, UNESCO issued the
2003 Declaration. The 2003 Declaration outlines necessary
measures states should take to combat intentional destruction
191. S.C. Res. 2199, supra note 118.
192. Id.
193. Dag Hammarskjold Library, Ask Dag: Are UN Resolutions Binding?,
ASK.UN.ORG, http://ask.un.org/faq/15010 (last visited Feb. 4, 2017).
194. 2003 Declaration, supra note 118.
195. Bearak, supra note 176; Edward Delman, Afghanistan’s Buddhas Rise
Again, ATLANTIC (June 10, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/ar-
chive/2015/06/3d-buddhas-afghanistan/395576/.
196. Delman, supra note 195.
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of cultural heritage and urges states to become parties to both
the 1954 Hague Convention and its Second Protocol.197 Most im-
portantly, UNESCO recognized in the 2003 Declaration that the
1954 Hague Convention and its First and Second Protocols did
not apply to the intentional destruction of cultural heritage com-
mitted by the Taliban because it did not occur during the trea-
ties’ limited definition of armed conflict, which excludes sporadic
acts of terrorism.198 This illustrates one of the significant short-
comings of the international legal framework for the protection
of cultural heritage during armed conflict, particularly in the
modern context of warfare involving non-state militant groups
that occupy and terrorize their regions without any official dec-
laration of war.199
E. Syrian Legal Framework
Syrian domestic law governing antiquities protection gives the
state’s antiquities authority exclusive power over the conserva-
tion, exportation, and excavation of Syrian antiquities.200 The
current Syrian Antiquities Law was originally passed in 1963,
and was last amended in 1999. It divides antiquities into two
categories: immoveable and moveable antiquities. Immoveable
antiquities are defined as “antiquities related to the land,” in-
cluding historic buildings or caves.201 In contrast, moveable an-
tiquities are defined as “separate from the land or from historic
buildings,” including statues and coins.202
Several provisions of the Syrian Antiquities Law are relevant
to the current armed conflict. Perhaps most relevant, Article 7
prohibits the destruction, transformation, or damaging of move-
able or immoveable antiquities.203 Further, Article 26 prohibits
the construction of military facilities within five hundred meters
of immovable cultural heritage. More broadly, Chapter Three,
including Articles 30 through 40, regulates the sale and transfer
197. 2003 Declaration, supra note 118.
198. Id.; see also supra Part III.A.
199. Gerstenblith, supra note 37, at 247 n.9.
200. Antiquities Law, Legislative Decree N. 222 of Oct. 26, 1963 (Syria),
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/fr/files/30606/11438206173Antiqui-
ties_Law.pdf/Antiquities%2BLaw.pdf [hereinafter Decree N. 222].
201. Id. art. 3.
202. Id.
203. Id. art. 7.
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of movable antiquities, prohibiting any movement without ex-
plicit state authorization and thus outlawing the antiquities
trafficking engaged in by ISIS.204 Chapter Four, consisting of Ar-
ticles 41 through 55, establishes rules for the excavation of an-
tiquities and mandates a state-issued license for all excavations,
thus definitively outlawing any unpermitted excavations, in-
cluding looting.205 Chapter Five goes on to establish criminal
penalties for the violations of the Syrian Antiquities Law.206 No-
tably, smuggling carries penalties significantly higher than
other violations, possibly suggesting the prevalence of the prob-
lem long before the outbreak of the conflict.207 Despite the com-
mitment to the protection of antiquities that the legislative text
exhibits, the current conflict significantly restricts the ability of
the Syrian government to enforce the laws, as it does not have
effective control over many areas of the country. Nonetheless,
the Syrian Director-General of Antiquities and Museums has
been working to pass new legislation with additional antiquities
protections.208
IV. HOW CAN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BETTER
PROTECT ANTIQUITIES IN THEMODERN CONTEXT OF ARMED
CONFLICT?
The current international legal framework for the protection
of cultural heritage during armed conflict is ineffective in the
post-9/11 context of modern warfare. Since 9/11, the nature of
international relations and the character of armed conflict have
drastically changed. Terrorist groups operate outside the estab-
lished concept of the nation-state, superseding the traditional
definition of armed conflict and forging a global clash of civiliza-
tions,209 which renders state borders and formal declarations of
war obsolete. Thus, terrorist organizations are able to evade
many international regulations in the law of armed conflict. The
204. Id. arts. 30–40.
205. Id. arts. 41–55.
206. Id. arts. 56–68.
207. Id. art. 56.
208. Lostal, supra note 52, at 7; see also Syrian Arab Republic, Ministry of
Culture: Dir.-Gen. of Antiquities & Museums, Completing New Draft Law on
Protection of Syrian Archaeological Heritage, GOV.SY (Dec. 22, 2013),
http://www.dgam.gov.sy/index.php?d=314&id=1114.
209. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGNAFF., Sum-
mer 1993.
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failure of international law to prevent the destruction of the
Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2003,210 and its subsequent failure to
impose legal responsibility on the Taliban, tragically exemplifies
the need for an updated legal framework for the protection of
cultural heritage. The consequences of the international commu-
nity’s failure to adequately address this legal shortfall are illus-
trated by the failure of international law to apply to ISIS’ wide-
spread destruction of cultural heritage in Syria. Thus, to prevent
further destruction of priceless antiquities and to ensure the ef-
fectiveness of international law, the international community
must strengthen protections for cultural property.
To address the failure of the current international legal frame-
work to adequately protect cultural property in the modern con-
text of warfare, the international community should promulgate
a Third Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention. In contrast to
amending the 1954 Hague Convention and its First and Second
Protocols, promulgating an additional protocol would ensure the
greatest likelihood of success because any Member State can
choose to sign the new protocol.211 Amending either the 1954
Hague Convention or its First or Second Protocol, however,
would require unanimous adoption by all state parties to the
original treaty.212 Further, drafting an entirely new treaty would
not only require substantial negotiations but would also create
two separate systems of treaty law governing the protection of
antiquities during armed conflict, thus complicating the existing
cultural heritage protections.
In 1999, the international community promulgated the Second
Protocol to the 1954Hague Convention after recognizing the fail-
ure of the 1954 Hague Convention.213 Many similar contributing
factors influencing UNESCO’s decision to draft the Second Pro-
tocol exist today, including the destruction of significant cultural
property during armed conflicts214 and the changing nature of
international armed conflict.215 Such destruction provides strong
210. Gerstenblith, supra note 37, at 247 n.9; Bearak, supra note 176.
211. Henckaerts, supra note 137, at 21, 23.
212. Id.
213. Toman, supra note 151, at 15–16; see supra Part III.A.
214. Toman, supra note 151, at 9–12. Referenced conflicts include the Iran-
Iraq war, the war in the former Yugoslavia, the first Gulf War, and the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988. Id.
215. Id. at 16.
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motivation to amend international regulations in order to ad-
dress the rise of global terrorist organizations and non-state ac-
tors. To an extent, the U.N. Security Council has already
adopted an updated approach that more adequately deals with
the presence of non-state actors in modern armed conflict, which
entails framing international protections together with the fight
against terrorism.216 Resolution 2199, for example, exemplifies
this approach by putting cultural heritage protections in the con-
text of fighting ISIS.217 This change, however, cannot be effective
until UNESCO revises its international treaty framework with
the same updated perspective, as treaty protections are more
comprehensive than U.N. Security Council Resolutions, which
typically deal with specific topics and situations.218
The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 2199 to reiterate
the obligations of Member States to prevent terrorist groups in
Iraq and Syria from benefiting from trade in oil and antiquities,
among other things.219 While U.N. Security Council Resolution
2199 is not substantively effective in the protection of Syrian
cultural heritage because it places no additional obligations on
Member States,220 the U.N. Security Council’s approach in draft-
ing Resolution 2199 serves as an effective reference to modernize
the current international treaty framework for the protection of
cultural property.221 Following the September 11th terrorist at-
tacks in 2001, the U.N. Security Council began to strengthen its
language in resolutions to more effectively fight terrorism.222 In
216. See VINCENT NEGRI, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG.,
LEGAL STUDY ON THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE THROUGH THE
RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS 3 (Mar. 25,
2015), http://www.unesco.org/new/filead-
min/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/pdf/Study_Negri_RES2199_01.pdf; see also S.C.
Res. 2199, supra note 118.
217. S.C. Res. 2199, supra note 118.
218. See, e.g., id.; S.C. Res. 2192 (Dec. 18, 2014); S.C. Res. 2132 (Dec. 24,
2013); S.C. Res. 2085 (Dec. 20, 2012).
219. Meetings Coverage, Security Council, Unanimously Adopting Resolu-
tion 2199 (2015), Security Council Condemns Trade with Al-Qaida Associated
Groups, Threatens Further Targeted Sanctions, U.N. Meetings Coverage
SC/11775 (Feb. 12, 2015) [hereinafter U.N. Meetings Coverage SC/11775].
220. Resolution 2199 does, however, place additional obligation on states that
have not ratified the 1954 Hague Convention or its First or Second Protocols.
See NEGRI, supra note 216.
221. U.N. Meetings Coverage SC/11775, supra note 219.
222. NEGRI, supra note 216.
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accordance with this approach, the U.N. Security Council ex-
panded its focus in the fight against terrorism to concentrate on
combatting conditions that favor the development and spread of
terrorism and extremist ideology, for example, by mandating
that states report on measures taken to prevent terrorist activi-
ties, criminalize various forms of terrorism, and promote cooper-
ation between themselves and other states in fighting terror-
ism.223 The U.N. Security Council’s shift in focus adequately re-
flects the necessity to mold international law to the post-9/11
context of modern warfare, where the most significant threats
come from terrorist organizations operating outside the estab-
lished definition of armed conflict.224 The 2003 destruction of the
Buddhas of Bamiyan by the Taliban in Afghanistan225 and the
failure of international law to address the destruction of cultural
property illustrates the need to integrate the U.N. Security
Council’s approach with the current international treaty frame-
work that governs the protection of cultural property during
armed conflict.226
To successfully integrate cultural heritage protections with a
focus on preventing terrorism,227 a Third Protocol should be
promulgated to include several elements and clarifications miss-
ing from the 1954 Hague Convention and its First and Second
Protocol. First, the Third Protocol should firmly establish the ap-
plication of cultural heritage protections to non-state actors, in-
cluding terrorist and insurgent groups. Second, the Third Proto-
col should expand the definition of armed conflict to include spo-
radic acts of violence or terrorism committed against cultural
heritage outside the event of declared war. Third, the Third Pro-
tocol should prohibit the sale or transfer of antiquities without
provenance or assurance of good title and impose criminal pen-
alties for those caught dealing or buying stolen antiquities orig-
inating from a conflict zone. Finally, the Third Protocol should
223. Id. at 3–4.
224. The Second Protocol applies to noninternational armed conflicts under
Article 22. See Second Protocol, supra note 28, art. 22. Article 22(2), however,
asserts that the Second Protocol does “not apply to situations of internal dis-
turbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and
other acts of a similar nature.” Id.
225. Bearak, supra note 176.
226. Because the Taliban’s occupation of Afghanistan did not technically con-
stitute an armed conflict according Article 22(2) of Second Protocol, the protec-
tions did not apply. See Gerstenblith, supra note 37, at 247 n.9.
227. NEGRI, supra note 216, at 4.
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establish guidelines for the storage of seized cultural objects de-
termined to have originated from a conflict zone.
A. Bind Non-State Actors
First, and most importantly, the Third Protocol should clearly
establish its application to all parties of an international or non-
international armed conflict, including non-state insurgent
groups. While the Second Protocol and portions of the 1954
Hague Convention apply to noninternational armed conflicts,
neither definitively apply to non-state actors.228 As the majority
of modern armed conflict deals with armed terrorist or insurgent
groups,229 the effectiveness of the Second Protocol and the 1954
Hague Convention are severely limited without such protec-
tions.230 ISIS’widespread destruction and looting of cultural her-
itage tragically evidences these limits.
In order for the Third Protocol to apply to a non-state actor,
the non-state entity must have international legal personality,
or the capability of possessing rights and duties under interna-
tional law.231 While conservative authorities maintain that only
states can have international legal personality, there is signifi-
cant support for the endowment of international legal personal-
ity on non-state actors based on their function on the interna-
tional stage.232 In evaluating whether a non-state actor pos-
sesses international legal personality, one must consider their
function, nature, role, and rights and duties under international
law and in relation to other international actors.233 In terms of
function, armed groups possess many characteristics similar to
228. See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26, arts. 18–19; Second Protocol, supra note 28, art.
22; see Henckaerts, supra note 137, at 83–84.
229. See NEGRI, supra note 216. See generally Blank & Farley, supra note
139; Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities:
The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 295 (2007).
230. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26; Second Protocol, supra note 28.
231. See Subjects of International Law, MAX PLANCK ENCYCL. PUB. INT’L L.,
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1476?rskey=L14yef&result=1&prd=EPIL (last updated May
2007).
232. William Thomas Worster, Relative International Legal Personality of
Non-State Actors, 42 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 207 (2016).
233. Id.
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that of states, including control of territory and state-like organ-
ization.234 Further, in terms of rights and duties under interna-
tional law, armed groups bear direct responsibly under interna-
tional human rights law, and some argue that non-state entities
can contribute to the formation of customary international
law.235 Accordingly, the nature of many armed groups, such as
ISIS, strongly suggest the presence of, at the very least, a limited
form of international legal personality, and thus the ability to
bear rights and responsibilities under international treaties,
such as the Third Protocol.
In particular, ISIS possesses many state-like characteristics,
suggesting it bears international legal personality as a non-state
armed group. For example, ISIS possesses a considerable
amount of territory in Syria and Iraq, and rules that territory on
a distinct set of laws.236 Further, the documents recovered by
U.S. Forces from the compound of Abu Sayyaf, ISIS’ director of
oil and gas and antiquities divisions, evidence an organized, gov-
ernment-like structure, with different departments assigned to
various government services and activities.237 ISIS has also en-
gaged in other state-like activities, such as issuing identification
cards for residents, promulgating fishing guidelines to preserve
stock, and mandating that automobiles carry toolkits for emer-
gencies.238 As ISIS continues to acquire and govern territory, the
organization is becoming more sophisticated and may soon begin
interacting with other international actors in an increasingly
state-like manner.
Further, if the Third Protocol were to eventually be estab-
lished as customary international law, it would apply to all in-
ternational legal personalities, regardless of whether they are
state parties.239 Customary international law is defined as “a
general practice accepted as law.”240 State practice (usus) and a
sense of subjective obligation to that practice (opinion juris sive
necessitates) by states are the primary elements considered in
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Wood, supra note 22; see also Tim Arango, Built on Terror, ISIS is
Planting Roots to Govern, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2015, at A1.
237. Keller, supra note 72.
238. Arango, supra note 236.
239. Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 125.
240. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933.
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establishing international law as customary.241 Scholars have al-
ready suggested that the 1954 Hague Convention represents
customary international law.242 If the Third Protocol were also
to gain recognition as customary international law and if its text
were to apply definitively to non-state actors, then there would
be clear language in place to hold armed groups, such as ISIS,
accountable for actions in violation of these cultural heritage
protections, as the treaty would already contemplate its applica-
tion to non-state actors.
B. Expand the Definition of Armed Conflict
The Third Protocol should expand the definition of armed con-
flict to include sporadic acts of violence or terrorism committed
against cultural heritage during periods outside the event of de-
clared war.243 Neither the 1954 Hague Convention or its First or
Second Protocols explicitly define armed conflict. Article 18 of
the 1954 Hague Convention states that its provisions only apply
in the event of a “declared war or any other armed conflict aris-
ing between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,” nota-
bly limiting its application to conflicts arising between State
Parties.244 Further, Article 22 of the Second Protocol specifically
excludes “sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar
241. Henckaerts, supra note 125, at 178.
242. Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 125; Hencka-
erts, supra note 125, at 178. The International Court of Justice, however, has
never deemed the 1954 Hague Convention as customary international law.
Henckaerts, supra note 125.
243. While Article 5 of the 1954 Hague Convention and Article 9 of the Sec-
ond Protocol establish applicability during formal occupation, neither of the
treaties establish whether these provisions apply to non-state occupations or
periods of transitory control. For example, there was a period of time when the
United States occupied Baghdad following its invasion before the United Na-
tions formally recognized the occupation on May 22, 2003. During this period
of informal occupation, the United States was not technically under any treaty
obligations as an occupier. Further, the 1954 Hague Convention and its Second
Protocol impose obligations on occupiers that are High Contracting Parties.
Nothing in the treaties indicates that the same obligations be placed on non-
state occupiers. See Gerstenblith, supra note 37, at 344; Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, supra note 26,
art. 5; Second Protocol, supra note 28, art. 9.
244. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26, art. 18.
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nature”245 within the protocol’s scope. The nature of armed con-
flict post-9/11, however, primarily has involved sporadic acts of
terrorism in areas where non-state organizations control terri-
tory outside formal government control. Although ISIS’ present
actions in Syria would most likely fall under the “event of de-
clared war” as defined by the 1954 Hague Convention,246 the or-
ganization’s destruction and looting of heritage in Iraq would
most likely not be protected under the current treaty framework
because Iraq is no longer technically in a state of declared war,
and thus falls outside the limited definition of armed conflict in
the 1954 Hague Convention and its First and Second Proto-
cols.247 As such, if ISIS were to maintain occupation of certain
areas of Syria after hostilities settle, expanding the scope of cul-
tural heritage protections to prohibit sporadic acts of violence
would mitigate the potential destruction that would likely occur
under ISIS rule. Accordingly, Syria could avoid a tragedy similar
to the Taliban’s destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in
2001.248
C. Prohibit Sale or Transfer of Looted Antiquities
The Third Protocol should also prohibit the sale or transfer of
antiquities likely originating from a conflict zone without prove-
nience or assurance of good title and should impose criminal
penalties for those caught dealing or buying stolen antiquities
known to have originated in the conflict zone. Currently, the
1954 Hague Convention and the Second Protocol solely address
the protection of cultural heritage located in a particular conflict
zone during an armed conflict.249 International protections of
cultural property, however, would be improved significantly by
strengthening the protection of said property if or when the
property leaves the conflict zone and enters the international
antiquities market.
245. Second Protocol, supra note 28, art. 22.
246. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26, art. 18; see also Second Protocol, supra note 28,
art. 22.
247. See Joseph Logan, Last U.S. Troops Leave Iraq, Ending War, REUTERS
(Dec. 18, 2011), www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-withdrawel-
idUSTRE7BH03320111218; Curry, supra note 35.
248. Bearak, supra note 177.
249. See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, supra note 26; Second Protocol, supra note 28.
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While Article 9 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention allows a
state party to call for an international effort for the protection of
cultural property in jeopardy,250 establishing greater coordina-
tion between the 1970 UNESCO Convention and armed conflict
protections of cultural heritage would significantly improve the
efficiency of both treaty goals. In light of the current conflict in
Syria, the Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, which was established by the Sec-
ond Protocol and is charged with managing the system of en-
hanced protection,251 has recognized the need for synergy be-
tween cultural property protections originating from different
treaty sources.252 In its meeting in December 2015, it called for
“further development of synergy with other UNESCO normative
instruments in the field of culture, programmes and the
strengthening of partnerships.”253 Formally codifying the protec-
tion of antiquities from illicit trafficking in the context of armed
conflict protections would impose on state parties the responsi-
bility to prohibit the sale of antiquities likely originating from a
particular conflict zone at the outbreak of armed conflict.
For example, in 2015, when ISIS began gaining territorial con-
trol in Syria, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 2199,
which specifically prohibited the trade of Syrian antiquities and
placed an affirmative duty on Member States to domestically
combat trafficking of illicit Syrian antiquities.254 When the loot-
ing of Iraqi cultural heritage became an issue following the 2003
invasion, the U.N. Security Council also passed a similar resolu-
tion.255 Resolutions, however, are largely reactionary. The U.N.
Security Council almost always promulgates them after an issue
has already arisen. Thus, if a provision in the Third Protocol
250. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 29, art. 9.
251. See UNESCO’s Executive Board and Other Organs Elected by the Gen-
eral Conference (38C), Intergovernmental Organs and Councils of UNESCO’s
Institutes, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG.,
http://www.unesco.org/eri/committees/Committees_and_Or-
gans_GC.asp?code=+2+76&language=E (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
252. See generally Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Pro-
tection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. CLT-
15/10.COM/CONF.203/4 (Sept. 23, 2015), unesdoc.unesco.org/im-
ages/0023/002352/235219E.pdf.
253. Id. at 2.
254. S.C. Res. 2199, supra note 118.
255. S.C. Res. 1483 (May 22, 2003).
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were implemented to automatically bind state parties to combat
illicit trafficking once an armed conflict has arisen, the protec-
tions would apply immediately without having to wait on the
U.N. Security Council to pass a resolution. Accordingly, estab-
lishing this duty at the outset of armed conflict would allow less
cultural heritage to enter foreign markets, thus possibly reduc-
ing incentives to loot and, at the very least, increasing the num-
ber of seizures by state authorities of illegally excavated items.
D. Establish Guidelines for the Storage of Looted Antiquities
Finally, the Third Protocol should establish guidelines for the
storage of seized cultural objects determined to have originated
from a conflict zone. These guidelines must include provisions
for the return of the cultural objects after the end of the conflict.
Thus, once a state has seized items likely originating from a con-
flict zone, this provision would impose an obligation on the seiz-
ing state to hold the items for safekeeping. Unlike the First Pro-
tocol, which imposed similar terms on occupying powers,256 this
provision would apply to all periods of armed conflict and not
just in the event of occupation. Further unlike the First Protocol,
states will not have the option to opt out of these substantive
protections.257
The Third Protocol would establish guidelines for safekeeping
to ensure that the antiquities are stored in proper conditions.
Further, the guidelines must include a documentation require-
ment, both to keep track of the artifacts in storage and to prevent
them from reentering foreign markets. The guidelines would
also allow for a preemptive exchange agreement with a foreign
museum so that museums that are likely to be in conflict zones
can contract with foreign museums to hold their collections. Ad-
ditionally, the Third Protocol would provide a set of rules for
eventual return, thus offering a type of refugee status for cul-
tural objects.258 These guidelines must include a determination
that the hostilities in the country from which the antiquities
originated have ended and that the origin country can now safely
256. Gerstenblith, supra note 37, at 265; Bejesky, supra note 37, at 405;
Howe, supra note 144, at 411.
257. See First Protocol, supra note 27, art. 9; see also supra Part III.A.
258. As ISIS Destroys Artifacts, Could Some Antiquities Have Been Saved?,
NPR (Sept. 5, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/paral-
lels/2015/09/05/437616132/as-isis-destroys-artifacts-could-some-antiquities-
have-been-saved.
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protect the antiquities. If the origin country meets such require-
ments, the antiquities must then be returned by the host coun-
try.
The British Museum in London, for example, is guarding an
object known to be looted from Syria and, in the past, has
guarded antiquities from Afghanistan, which are now being re-
turned.259 The museum, however, is acting more upon the basis
of goodwill rather than upon international obligation. In con-
trast, following the Iraqi invasion, the United States required
the return of any cultural patrimony known to have originated
in Iraq.260 While seemingly noble on the surface, in practice the
law put cultural heritage back into harm’s way by returning it
to an unstable war zone.261 Thus, a safekeeping provision would
ensure the safety of cultural heritage originating from a war
zone while also mandating that the cultural heritage return to
its country only after hostilities have ended.
CONCLUSION
ISIS’ destruction and looting of cultural heritage is but one of
the terrors the armed group has inflicted on Syrian communi-
ties. Nonetheless, ISIS’ recent destruction of Palmyra shocked
the world’s conscience. For centuries, vast temple columns stood
in the middle of the desert, inspiring travelers and enlightening
future generations. The ruins of the ancient city told tales of the
cultures and communities that lived and died there for thou-
sands of years. The crumbled buildings now tell a different
story—one of failure. ISIS’ destruction of Palmyra, and many
other ancient sites in Syria, reflects the failure of the interna-
tional community to adequately protect archaeological sites and
property of cultural significance. Such barbarism should pro-
voke more from the international community than a passing
statement or resolution. Rather, it should initiate substantive
action that will protect ancient sites and antiquities for many
259. British Museum ‘Guarding’ Object Looted from Syria, BBC NEWS (June
5, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-33020199.
260. See 19 U.S.C. § 2609(c) (2017); As ISIS Destroys Artifacts, Could Some
Antiquities Have Been Saved?, supra note 258; see also Kristin Romey, Despite
ISIS Threat, Looted Antiquities Returning to Iraq, NAT’LGEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 24,
2015), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/03/150324-iraq-artifacts-re-
turn-isis-baghdad-museum-islamic-state-archaeology/.
261. As ISIS Destroys Artifacts, Could Some Antiquities Have Been Saved?,
supra note 258.
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years into the future. Without such action, humanity will lose
much more than old buildings and artifacts: it will lose the abil-
ity to see into the past and to understand the struggles, tri-
umphs, beliefs, and lessons of civilizations that came long before
us, but continue to live on through what they left behind.
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